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Since the 1970’s, social scientists have argued that general pro-environmental 
attitudes have diffused throughout American society, rendering socio-demographics 
largely irrelevant in predicting support for such issues. The public reaction to the issue of 
climate change, however, evades this narrative. While media bias, ideological framing, 
and business influence, among others, are partial explanations, I argue that ignoring the 
potential implications of structure and culture—specifically social class—in determining 
why the issue is so demonstrably divisive is a crucial mistake. Building upon the 
postmaterialism thesis of Inglehart with the cultural theory of Bourdieu, I examine how 
the conception of and reaction to the issue varies with economic and cultural capital using 
data from 42 interviews of Boston-area respondents. The results suggest that climate 
change may indeed be a ‘classed’ issue—both in how the respondents conceive of it in 
the first place, and how they speak of social class in the context of it. The political 
implications are various, but suggest that coalition formation will need to take account of 
these differences, both real and perceived, in both engendering public support for 
mitigation efforts and subsequently combating the problem.  
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Since the 1970’s, social scientists and polling researchers have argued that pro-
environmental attitudes and concern have diffused throughout American society, 
rendering social class and other socio-demographics largely irrelevant as predictors 
(Buttell & Flinn, 1978; Buttell, 1987; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980; Morrison & Dunlap, 
1986; Samdahl & Roberston, 1989; Dunlap & McCright, 2008a, p. 1051).  However, 
while general environmental concern has become ubiquitous in the U.S., the same cannot 
be said for anthropogenic climate change. Social scientists have documented substantial 
declines in public concern over the last decade, particularly among political conservatives 
(Dunlap & McCright, 2008b). More recently, public polling organizations have similarly 
chronicled an overall decline in concern about the issue, dovetailing with the recent 
economic downturn (Jones, 2011; Newport, 2010; Pew, 2009). On a cross-national level, 
Americans appear to be less concerned about climate change than the publics of almost 
all other industrialized countries (Brechin, forthcoming). And while the issue is often 
ranked last among social issues like the economy by the U.S. public, recent surveys 
indicate it raises less concern than even other environmental problems (Saad, 2011; Saad, 
2009). Researchers have offered many reasons for why the issue does not engender 
greater overall concern. Unlike many other environmental issues, climate change is often 
conceived of as a spatially and temporally distant problem (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni 
et al, 2006; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Weber, 2006). Media narratives have also 
portrayed the science as contested, when in reality there is broad consensus about the 
causes and possible, probable effects (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Researchers also point 
to organized political and business forces who have wielded considerable financial and 
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political power in promoting a skeptical outlook on the reality of the problem (Jacques, 
Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008). While these explanations are convincing, there are reasons to 
suspect social class may also play a role in conceptualizations of and reactions to climate 
change. Krosnick et al (2006, p. 31) suggest the abstract nature of the issue results in it 
being perceived as divorced from immediate material concerns in the eyes of the public, 
making it an archetypal ‘postmaterialist’ issue. This reading of climate change as 
postmaterialist, according to Inglehart’s theory, would render it a concern predominantly 
among the ‘new class’ of the educated and relatively affluent (Inglehart, 1981). There is 
evidence that the lack of concern for climate change is not distributed across social 
groups equally, with some evidence of class metrics—namely education and income—
having positive associations with concern and attitudes (Shrode & Morris, 2009; 
Leiserowitz et al, 2009), as well as policy support (McCright, 2009, p. 1042; O’Connor, 
Bord, & Fisher, 1999, p. 469).  
 Building on Inglehart’s postmaterialism thesis (1981; 1987) and the cultural 
theory of Bourdieu (1984), this paper examines whether climate change is a ‘classed’ 
issue, paying particular attention to both consumption patterns and lifestyle practices 
related to sustainability and climate, and what participants take those to signify. 
Bourdieu’s theory is valuable because it allows a complex view of social class in the 
Weberian tradition, rather than an economically reductionist approach. Just as for Weber 
economic power was not synonymous with social status (Weber, 1946, p. 180), Bourdieu 
holds that tastes are reified in a manner dependent on both material (economic) and 
symbolic (cultural) capital. By studying whether and/or how social class conditions 
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beliefs about climate change, I ask these guiding questions: Is the issue interpreted as an 
abstract problem that results in those who are materially or symbolically privileged 
expressing more robust concern for it, or a greater willingness to sacrifice in the end of 
mitigation? Are ‘green’ consumption objects seen as distanced from the essential, 
utilitarian considerations one would expect of the lower classes, according to the cultural 
theory of Bourdieu? Finally, do economic and cultural capital, in an aggregative and 
compositional sense, condition conceptualizations of climate change and the respondents’ 
perception of the social response to it? I examine these questions using data from in-
depth interviews of a socially, culturally, and economically diverse sample of 42 Boston-
area respondents.  
 
Social Class and the Environment: A Complex Narrative 
While general ‘pro-environmental’ dispositions have become quite popular in the 
U.S., a careful reading of the literature reveals the possibility that the relationship 
between social class and general environmental attitudes is more complex than this 
narrative would at first suggest. The gap between attitudes and behaviors is one area 
where social class takes on significance, as researchers frequently theorize that material 
and cultural constraints play an important role in the actualization (or lack thereof) of 
attitudes (e.g. Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 249). In her meta-analysis of the racial 
dimensions of the attitude-behavior gap, Taylor (1989, p. 199) similarly posits that a 
combination of resource variables (money, political knowledge, etc.) are an important 
mediator of behavior. Kennedy et al, using a Canadian sample, found that respondents 
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often described the gap between their attitudes and behaviors in terms of time and money 
constraints (2009, p. 156). Indeed, empirical studies have often found associations 
between income, education—sometimes both—and recycling, a ‘baseline’ environmental 
behavior (Gamba & Oskamp, 1994; Schultz, 1995; Berger, 1997; Jenkins, Martinez, 
Palmer, and Podolsky, 2003; Sidique, Lupi, & Joshi, 2010). Researchers have also found 
education to correlate positively with pro-environmental civic participation (Barkan, 
2004).  
Social class also appears relevant in terms of attitudes related to climate change 
specifically. Research which groups the population in six categories related to the issue, 
ranging from the ‘alarmed’ to ‘dismissive,’ finds those who are ‘cautious,’ i.e. believe 
climate change is happening but are lukewarm to mitigation efforts, as well as those who 
are ‘disengaged’ from the issue, were most likely to be low income and have less 
educational attainment (Leiserowitz, 2009). Shrode and Morris (2009), using 2006 GSS 
data, found that both income and education were significant, positive predictors of 
climate change concern. In their survey research, Lubell et al (2007) examined policy 
support, political participation, and general behaviors related to climate change, and 
found that education positively correlates with all three dimensions, while income is 
positively associated with the latter two. O’Connor, Bord, and Fisher (1999), in their 
analysis of risk perception related to climate change, found that those with higher 
educational attainment and income support governmental mitigation efforts in greater 
numbers. In their study of 49 American metropolitan statistical areas, Zahran et al (2008, 
p. 468) found that the most significant contributors to a sustainability index composed of 
 5 
factors such as municipal climate group membership and public transportation networks 
were civic capacity, education, income, and other ‘human capital’ proxy measures. And 
in their regional study, Dietz et al (2007) found that income was positively associated 
with general policy support regarding climate change. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that higher material security and cultural capital are to some extent associated 
with affirming climate change as a problem, and perhaps more so with supporting certain 
policy efforts in the U.S. to combat it (i.e. when tangible costs are introduced).   
Indeed, affluence on a national level is often used to explain the ascendance of 
environmentalism more generally in the postwar U.S. (Inglehart, 1981; 1982; Inglehart & 
Abramson, 1999). As American affluence increased in the post-WWII era, empirical 
studies began focusing on the rise of the ‘postmaterial’ left, which was embodied by the 
‘new class.’ The new class is characterized by a liberal political ideology derived from its 
position in the realm of production—antagonistic to the business class as a result—along 
with high levels of cultural capital, i.e. well-educated, middle class professionals whose 
salaries were not directly dependent on capitalist modes of production (Ehrenreich & 
Ehrenreich, 1977; Gouldner, 1978; Lamont, 1987). Many theorists have connected the 
rise of the new class to the success of mainstream environmentalism, arguing that the 
movement is predominantly composed of middle-class professionals high in cultural 
capital (but not necessarily income), with ambivalent or negative views of the growth-
oriented capitalist economic framework (Abramson & Inglehart, 1994; Eckersley, 1989; 
Pichardo, 1997, p. 418; Rose, 1997). The embrace of political liberalism by the educated 
upper middle class signified a crucial inversion of traditional political alignments, which 
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set the stage for the ascendance of working-class conservatism. This development led 
some to proclaim a decline in class-based voting patterns (i.e. working classes voting in 
their apparent economic interest) (Clark, Lipset, & Rempel, 1993; Clark, 2003; Hechter, 
2004). Others argue that class-based voting still persists, but is complemented by the rise 
of ‘cultural’ voting, partly consistent with the postmaterialism and new class theories 
(Achterberg, 2006; Van der Waal, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2007). This realignment led 
some segments of the working-class, especially those with lower educational attainment, 
to increasingly “reaffirm the traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, 
military security, and domestic order” (Inglehart, 1987, p. 1297).  
When viewed in the context of these findings, important caveats emerge that 
begin complicating the 'environmentalism as ubiquitous' narrative. While many theories 
of sustainability center upon efficiency and reform within capitalism—the ‘ecological 
modernization’ approach being a prominent example of this (Mol, 2003)—others stress 
‘sufficiency’ principles, which entail slowing or stopping economic growth (e.g. Princen, 
2005; Schnaiberg, 1980). Indeed, the ‘limits to growth’ concept is an integral facet of the 
‘New Environmental Paradigm,’ a prolific theoretical concept and related popular 
empirical metric of general environmental attitudes (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, 
2008). Evidence shows that while Americans embrace environmental protection in a 
general sense, they are much less willing to sacrifice economic growth for the sake of it. 
For instance, recent survey data indicates that Americans would prioritize economic 
growth even if it meant the environment “suffers to some extent,” attitudes likely 
amplified by the recent global recession (Jones, 2011; Newport, 2009). Uyeki and 
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Holland (2000) similarly find that while general pro-environmental attitudes are 
common, there are negative correlations between income, education, and support for the 
‘less growth’ paradigm. In their study of activists and the lay public in the Pacific 
Northwest, Ellis and Thompson (1997) examined cultural divergence between the two 
groups, and highlighted a clear distinction between affirming general pro-environmental 
attitudes, which the public did espouse, and rejecting “the acquisitive life of competitive 
individualism” characterized by neoliberal capitalism, which they did not (Ellis & 
Thompson, 1997, p. 892). And as Guber notes (2003, p. 44), most Americans seem to 
affirm the more promethean notion of sustainability as nested within current capitalist 
frameworks of growth and technological advancement, simultaneously desiring 
environmental protection but also embracing the ‘dominant’ growth-oriented paradigm. 
While economic growth and the attenuation of carbon dioxide emissions related to 
climate change may not be inconsistent with one another, there is evidence that if 
Americans were asked to sacrifice the former for the latter, they would largely reject the 
proposition. As such, while Americans embrace the importance of the environment in a 
general sense, they are far less likely to affirm the principles of steady-state economics 
and voluntary simplicity that many call for in response to global ecological problems. 
Finally, there is evidence that social class may be a crucial factor in whether they do 
affirm this ‘less growth’ approach.  
 
Cultural Capital and Consumption: The Aesthetics of Asceticism 
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Though the postmaterialism thesis contributes to the social understanding of 
environmentalism by stressing the importance of economics, it nevertheless offers a 
limited picture of how social class relates to attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, particularly 
related to issues like climate change. Here, Bourdieu’s multi-dimensional taxonomy of 
class becomes valuable, as it differentiates economic and cultural capital and illustrates 
how they may work at shaping dispositions in unexpected ways. This theory can 
simultaneously explain materialist orientations of the working class, as well as the 
likelihood that those who possess high economic but low cultural capital are ambivalent 
toward environmental issues. The materialist preference for utility in those with lower 
economic and cultural capital—or, a preoccupation with immediate material needs—
contrasts with the “asceticism of the privileged,” whereby the affluent distance 
themselves from the necessity characterizing the lower classes (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 256). 
Analyzing both economic and cultural capital is crucial, as the new class narrative of 
environmentalism in the past few decades indicates. In this formulation, high levels of 
cultural capital influence political goals and aesthetic dispositions irrespective of 
economic capital above a certain income. Those possessing high levels of cultural (but 
not necessarily economic) capital are theorized to exhibit a preference for an abstract 
aesthetic, and a sophisticated yet ascetic orientation which precludes the distinguishing 
need for economic capital in the first place.  
 The application of Bourdieu’s cultural theory to an American context has not been 
without criticism. Studies have found that those possessing high cultural capital are 
‘omnivores’ who consume a range of objects and genres across the popular to high-brow 
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spectrum (e.g. Erickson, 1996; Peterson & Kern, 1996). In contrast, Holt (1997) argues 
that Bourdieu’s theory never posits cultural proclivities as operating monolithically 
across contexts, nor does Bourdieu claim his metrics of class disposition (e.g. a taste for 
opera as opposed to jazz) operate in a nomothetic fashion. More importantly, ‘styles’ of 
consuming rather than status objects are more significant in gauging ‘classed’ 
dispositions in a postmodern historical context, where mass production affords many the 
ability to own goods or participate in behaviors which were once rarified (Holt, 1997, p. 
104; Peterson & Kern, 1996, p. 904). As Berger and Ward (2010) illustrate, those high in 
cultural capital often use subtle signals to convey more sophisticated aesthetic 
dispositions, rather than clear objectified markers. Moreover, people with high levels of 
cultural capital can co-opt working-class aesthetics in an attempt at distinguishing 
themselves from the emulation of the middle classes, which illustrates the non-linearity 
of Bourdieu’s cultural theory and again illustrates the importance of embodied practice 
over objectified taste (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 282; Trigg, 2001). From this, and various 
empirical studies which have bolstered the validity of Bourdieu’s theory of cultural 
consumption in an American context (e.g. Freidland et al, 2007; Holt, 1998), we should 
expect some material objects and even practices to diffuse across class lines to some 
extent. Yet this does not preclude more substantive orientations and the calculus behind 
them from varying across differing levels and compositions of capital.  
Bourdieu’s theory is useful in analyzing patterns of environmentally conscious 
consumption (i.e. ‘green’ material goods: products which are manufactured to contribute 
to environmental sustainability to some extent). Using this formulation, necessity and 
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utility (i.e. conventional products) stand in contrast to environmentally friendly goods, 
which are not merely used for their own sake, but in aid of a larger goal, be it ecological, 
political, health-related, etc. Moreover, general “material paucity” (Holt, 1998, p. 11) and 
asceticism is also theorized to be aesthetically desirable to those with high cultural 
capital, as they experience markedly different relationships with material necessity than 
those with lower overall levels of capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Consumption itself is an 
increasingly important vector of reflexive identity-making, which signifies a 
manifestation of politics and lifestyle pursuits- e.g. buying X or Y product to express 
individualized political goals or dispositions (Connolly & Prothero, 2008; Giddens, 1991; 
Guber, 2003, p. 154; Lewis, 2008; Schor, 1998; Shah et al, 2007; Soron, 2010; 
Trentmann, 2007). Starr illustrates using 2006 GSS data that although positive attitudes 
toward green or ‘ethical’ products cut across nearly all demographics except sex (with 
women more likely to express an affinity for them), self-reported practices are 
significantly and positively associated with income, and to a far greater extent, education 
(2009, p. 923). Onyango et al found that education and political liberalism were 
significant in determining organic food purchasing in the U.S. (2007, p. 407), while 
European research (Brécard et al 2009) examining ‘eco-friendly’ fish consumers 
similarly found that they were better educated and more affluent than the general 
population. Nevertheless, studies examining ‘green’ consumption often ignore the role of 
social class or structure and focus on values (Karp, 1996), identity-making projects 
(Soron, 2010), affect (Hartmann & Apaolaza-Ibáñez, 2008), and psycho-social 
dispositions (Hobson, 2006).  
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Other research has also focused on these factors rather than socio-demographic 
and cultural variables. For instance, Tadajewski and Wagner-Tsukamoto (2006) 
interviewed consumers in the UK and Germany, and concluded that cognitive limitations 
preclude a complex engagement with and embrace of green consumption practices. In 
this model, consumers are bricoleurs whose practices hinge upon cognitive, but not 
structural, limitations. Shaw et al (2005) used focus groups consisting of self-described 
‘ethical’ consumers to examine underlying motivations, and stressed values (e.g. 
benevolence) as integral to this process. Rather than focusing on attitudes or cognition, 
Brown (2010) sees conscious consumption as a social ritual mediated by emotions and 
community formation around specific brands. In their study of young Finnish respondents 
who identify as green consumers, Autio et al do mention the economic and knowledge 
constraints which may preclude some from engagement (2009, p. 46), yet ultimately 
frame the issue as a larger-scale collective action problem. Evans and Abrahamse (2009) 
similarly argue that individualized attempts at consuming sustainably are futile in the 
absence of structural changes based on their field work examining sustainability 
advocates in the UK, echoing Moisander (2007), among others. While these approaches 
contribute to our understanding of the issues involved in consuming ‘sustainably’—
particularly collective action dilemmas and the need for structural changes—I argue that 
neglecting socio-demographics (particularly social class) in discussions of environmental 
behaviors and structural constraint is a common weakness in the literature.  
Qualitative studies have engaged with issues of class and constraint, though 
sometimes indirectly. In their study of UK consumers and their willingness to purchase 
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local foods, Chambers et al (2007) found that time, money, and general lifestyle 
inconsistencies were among the greatest barriers for respondents. Young et al conducted 
interviews with self-described green consumers in the UK and found financial cost, time 
for research, and knowledge were among the greatest constraints (2009, p. 29). Guthman 
(2003) traces the historical transformation of organic food from a countercultural symbol 
of resistance to ‘yuppie chow.’ Similarly, Johnston (2008) and Johnston and Baumann 
(2009, p. 149) situate organic and local foods within an elite, refined aesthetic, 
problematizing its connection with the moral connotations of ‘conscious’ consumer 
behavior. In her examination of a sustainability advocacy group in the UK, Hobson 
points out that many respondents reject calls for curtailing consumption practices in light 
of the economic difficulties they have to endure in their day-to-day lives (2002, p. 111). 
Strandbu and Krange (2003, p. 190) found that working-class Swedish youth framed 
environmental issues in more immediate, materialist, and practical terms than their 
middle-class counterparts, rejecting an abstract ‘romantic gaze’ of nature. And in their 
U.S. research on Hummer drivers, Leudicke, Thompson, and Giesler illustrate how 
consumption objects are infused with narratives of morality that are consistent with the 
signaling of status distinctions and the consequent social antagonism (e.g. ‘the profane 
Hummer driver,’ or the ‘pious Prius owner’) (2009, p. 1030).    
Though the more affluent or educated may consume ‘green’ products with greater 
frequency than others, this does not necessarily make their lifestyles more sustainable 
when considering overall energy use and patterns of material consumption (see: Hurth, 
2010; Gatersleben et al, 2002). Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of green 
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consumption patterns related to both objects and practices are a necessary component of 
examining the ‘classed’ dimensions of attitudes toward sustainability, climate change, 
and behaviors related to that orientation. 
 
Methods 
This study is based on interviews that examined attitudes toward the environment, 
climate change, and social class. The data was collected over a three month period with 
42 Boston-area respondents in the summer of 2010. Respondents were solicited through 
classified advertisements on craigslist, a popular web-based classifieds service 
(specifically the ‘volunteers’ section), and given ten dollars in compensation for their 
time. Interviews lasted from approximately 30 minutes to an hour, were digitally 
recorded, transcribed, and the results analyzed using the atlas.ti software package. The 
interviews were semi-structured; the researcher had a core set of questions, while follow-
ups varied based on the initial responses of the participants. Data on the participant’s age, 
sex, ethnicity, income, occupation, educational attainment, parents’ educational 
attainment and occupations, political affiliation, and home and car ownership status were 
also collected. From the socio-economic (income, home ownership, and car ownership) 
and cultural (education, parent’s education) variables, subscales were generated to 
measure the levels of economic and cultural capital possessed by the respondents.1
                                                            
1 For determining whether individuals were assigned to LEC/HEC or LCC/HCC categories, points were 
allocated based on the respondent’s income and home/car ownership status (for economic capital) and 
total years of tertiary education between the participants and their parents (for cultural capital). If the 
respondent scored above an 18 in the economic calculation—roughly equivalent to a homeowner who 
 LEC 
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respondents had an average of $18,000 in self-reported income, compared to $87,000 for 
the HEC category. LCC respondents reported an average of 4.19 years of tertiary 
education between them and their parents, while the HCC averaged 15.2 (see Appendix B 
for detailed descriptive figures for all categories).  
The sample consists of 42 adults living in the Boston metro region, with all 
respondents living within the I-95 belt surrounding the city proper. Participants overall 
earned an average of $35,881 annually, while the median reported income was $22,500. 
The presence of a small number of students who reported no earnings, as well as those 
unemployed in a strong recession, reduced both the mean and median income figures. 
The median age was 42 years, compared to 36.8 nationally. There were 15 males and 27 
females. There were 28 respondents who identified as white, 7 as black or African 
American, 3 as Asian, and 4 as Hispanic. All of the respondents have at least a high 
school education, with 16 possessing a bachelor’s, 9 a master’s (including M.B.A.’s), and 
2 with J.D.’s. There were no participants with either medical or doctoral degrees (though 
some respondents did have parents that held these degrees). Eleven of the participants 
were registered as Independent, 22 as Democrat, and 9 unregistered. Massachusetts is 
characterized by high levels of Independent enrollment and low levels of Republican 
enrollment, so while the lack of Republicans is not unexpected, the sample does skew 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
makes $45,000 annually, or a renter who makes around six figures—they were assigned to the HEC 
category. If the respondents and their parents had 12 or more years of tertiary education between 
them—8 for those from single parent households—they were assigned to the HCC category. See Appendix 
A for detailed description and complete data for all respondents.  
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Democratic.2
Means and Ends: Utility, Necessity, and the Aesthetics of Asceticism 
 Eight of the respondents owned homes, 4 were paying off mortgages, and 
30 were renters. All names used in this analysis are pseudonyms.  
 
Data and Analysis 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural consumption is based on the notion of a dominant 
class which is economically insulated from material necessity and culturally inclined to 
symbolic aesthetics. For those with a higher aggregate level of capital, these “tastes of 
freedom” are expressed in an antagonistic relationship with the vulgar “tastes of 
necessity” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 56). While the literature suggests that economic status is 
related to concern for climate change, the cultural dimension complicates the 
relationship. That is to say, two respondents with the same level of economic capital but 
differing levels of cultural capital would theoretically be expected to harbor different 
views based on their respective capital composition. We begin by exploring respondent’s 
articulations of ‘sustainable’ behaviors and material goods against the backdrop of 
climate change, focusing on how the composition of capital (e.g. high cultural but low 
economic capital) shapes the conceptualization. While I often find similar consumption 
habits and lifestyle practices across the class spectrum, these were often undertaken with 
different rationales, strategies, and outlooks.  
 
                                                            
2 See the Secretary of State of Massachusetts’ compilation of enrollment statistics: 




Many of the respondents with low levels of both economic and cultural capital 
(LEC/LCC) conceptualized what they saw as environmentally friendly behaviors in terms 
of frugality and necessity. These respondents connected climate change with 
environmental problems more broadly, and viewed their actions in the context of a more 
general pro-environmental attitude. Mostly, these were simpler, ‘baseline’ environmental 
behaviors, such as recycling and turning off lights when not in use. Elias, a 44 year old 
unemployed clerk, valorizes those who aim to “mak(e) the world a safer place,” though 
stresses the difficulty of various behaviors with a limited income:  
I think they (people who act or buy ‘sustainably’) got money…‘cause it costs 
money to be saving the environment and if you’re poor you can’t buy a hybrid 
and you can’t buy organic foods. So the first impression I get if this guy is 
recycling and buying a hybrid and going to Whole Foods (is) he can do that, 
because he has money. I mean…it would be nice to have a hybrid, who doesn’t 
want to get 60mpg? You can drive around all day.   
 
Abby, a 30 year old finishing her degree in Boston (LEC/LCC), claimed that in 
her home town of East Los Angeles—a relatively poor and working-class section of 
L.A.—there is less of a willingness to tackle environmental issues by changing lifestyles, 
given the immediacy of poverty and material necessity: 
And so there is less of a willingness…the only time I think that changes is I heard 
one time of a family that sent their kid to MIT based on just recycling. 
Like…yeah. It was like this big thing in L.A., how this family had recycled, they 
had this whole—that was their full time job. But that wasn’t out of…that was out 
of necessity, not because they’re concerned with the environment I think. So…if 
you see people doing a lot of recycling at home and whatnot that- occupy the 
lower classes, it’s because they need the money. 
 
LEC/LCC respondents did sometimes change consumption strategies in reacting 
to what they perceived as environmental detriments of certain products, but within their 
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economic strictures. While unable to make a wholesale revision of their consumption 
practices in response to environmental issues, they do selectively engage in ‘conscious’ 
consumer activity when the price is comparable to conventional products. Dan, a 72 year 
old retired hotel worker, claimed he was concerned about environmental problems and 
willing to purchase products with that in mind, but only so long as they were comparable 
in price to more conventional alternatives: 
I bought some detergent the other day and it was marked down two dollars, plus I 
had a coupon for another buck—so I wound up saving three bucks. Because it 
started out pretty high, at $9.99, so I only paid $6.99, which in terms of value, it 
was rated the same with everything else, pretty much. And then you know you’re 
getting really good…a good product, you know, and everything. They’re using 
biodegradable—using—and they’re all about that stuff, biodegradable, no 
phosphates, no this or no that. So I guess I am pretty concerned about you 
know…will I buy…as long as I can afford to, you know? 
 
Laura (LEC/LCC), a 21 year old student finishing her degree and working for an 
ad agency in Boston, talked about strategies of ‘green’ consumption that hinged on 
lessening waste and saving money through actions like general conservation rather than 
buying ‘conscious’ products themselves: 
You know, you just have a bottle that you use, a mug that you use, not every time, 
obviously…but I know for example most of my friends, they’ll just buy, if they 
have a car they’ll buy like three packs of those huge water bottle things instead of 
just buying a water bottle and a brita or something. It’ll save them money, save 
them waste, and it’s probably annoying to have to clean out your water bottle, but 
why not?  
 
Others similarly focused on relatively modest practices that they viewed as both 
environmentally friendly and economically prudent. Samuel (LEC/LCC), a 59 year old 
unemployed former retailer, affirms the importance of environmental problems, but 
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connects them with what he perceives as more foundational macro-level economic 
conditions: 
S: If we can lower our electric bills, that’ll give us more money to pay for, oh, 
let’s say, the leap. Or when the gas price goes up at Labor Day, which it will. Or 
the price of oil goes up this winter, which it will because uh oh we didn’t get any 
oil stored, we were making gasoline that nobody bought.  
I: So you think it just makes good… 
S: Good sense. Good economic sense, yeah. 
 
Other LEC/LCC respondents also frame sustainable practices in terms of 
necessity, but rather than selectively adopting these consumption behaviors or lifestyle 
changes, they reject them based on their perception that they are decoupled from 
immediate material conditions, or are merely symbolic overtures that are devoid of 
substance. While at times these feelings were exacerbated by contentions that the concern 
over climate change is exaggerated, the disjunction between the issue and material 
necessity was often highlighted regardless. Rhonda, a 45 year old who is self-employed 
and thinks warnings over global warming are overstated, sees organic food as 
symbolizing a signaling of social status: 
I think it’s a status thing. Like I said, when I walk into Whole Foods (WF), I say 
to myself ‘I feel great in here, look at these people—the type of people, more 
sophisticated, classy people.’ So I think sometimes…I don’t know what 
percentage, but I tend to think that a lot of people probably see it as a 
sophisticated status symbol. ‘Oh, I can shop in here.’ You can see the WF bag, 
see Trader Joe’s—OK, that person is in a certain category.  
 
Ron, a 40 year old plumber who also has an exterminator’s license (LEC/LCC), 
contends that most of the ‘green’ products he encounters both on the job and in his 
personal life are devoid of any utility. While he expresses amusement rather than scorn or 
criticism, he sees these actions as well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective:  
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Ron: Like the hybrids…oh yeah (laughs). Yeah, I see it. And although I may 
get…have a little chuckle or something over something, I don’t think bad of them. 
I mean if you’re going to try to do something to save the planet or to do the best 
you can, god bless you. I don’t have bad opinions of them, but sometimes I must 
admit I get a chuckle and be like, well that doesn’t work, but god bless you, go 
ahead and try. 
Interviewer: Like what? 
R: I don’t know, like somebody that’s telling me they’re spraying their lawn with 
rosemary to help their grass be green…I know that’s not going to work. But you 
know I don’t fault them for trying, because if you’re going to make an effort to do 
something good, I’m not going to be negative about it. But I have to admit I get a 
little chuckle.  
 
In cultural terms, this reflects the different views of theory and practice which 
often characterizes the professional and working classes—“practical, partial, tacit know-
how” contrasted with “theoretical, systematic, explicit knowledge,” respectively 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 387). While other social agents feel these strategies (e.g. buying 
hybrids to mitigate environmental problems on an individual level) are presumably 
‘doing something,’ Ron instead sees only ‘useless’ action devoid of practical efficacy. 
Similarly, HEC/LCC respondents often stress considerations of practicality and price in 
buying green goods, commensurate with their capital composition. Richard, a 48 year old 
accountant (HEC/LCC), expresses less of a financial constraint in terms of consuming, 
yet frames his consumption patterns in practical health concerns:  
I will look, I will try and buy organic…we have a farmer’s market up here on 
Monday… I’ll try and you know whether it’s organic…so I guess more buying 
locally, number one. And then if it’s organic, fine. I mean both Stop and Shop and 
Whole Food. I was there the other day near Mass General seeing a client, and WF 
is, you know, is supposed to be 100% organic, so just trying to you know…and 
the quality of the food is good. So I guess for food products, um…. not saying 
that cost is no issue, but I think it’s easier from a food perspective, because you’re 
eating the pesticides and things like that.  
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Ruth, a 55 year old lawyer working for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
(HEC/LCC), also stresses practicality when discussing ‘green’ consumer goods, but 
highlights the efficacy of the product compared to conventional counterparts rather than 
personal health:  
Well…I certainly see them picking out the (green) goods in the supermarket…I 
don’t talk to them about it, but I’m sure there’s a reason that they’re doing it and 
they probably think they’re doing a good thing. And maybe they are…so I don’t 
know. But I don’t think all of the stuff I’ve found so far is great (laughs). I 
haven’t tried…I haven’t driven a hybrid vehicle…I feel awful saying if I were to 
do that in the future, it might be more to save on the expensive gasoline which 
keeps going up and up, as opposed to thinking it was environmentally great.  
 
 Yvette, a 42 year old legal analyst (HEC/LCC), reports that she is an avid 
recycler, uses canvas bags at the grocer, avoids driving whenever possible, and owns a 
hybrid, but stops short at conceding energy use in the end of curbing her effect on the 
environment:  
So you know, we try to do things like that as much as possible, but am I not going 
to turn off my air conditioning? No. I mean, we keep the house pretty cold in the 
winter, but it’s…not as much about preserving the environment as it is to not pay 
the cost of heating oil. You know it’s a combination of things…but if heating oil 
was really cheap, we’d probably turn the heat up a little more. So we try to do 
what we can, but we’re accustomed to an American lifestyle.  
 
 HEC respondents do not stress material necessity as many LEC respondents do, 
yet still retain a materialist orientation with respect to goods and practices based on their 
capital composition. That is, though differences in economic capital reflect less constraint 
in consuming certain products and greater insulation from necessity, LCC respondents 
are still united in a materialist orientation which prides efficacy, practicality, and frugality 





Rather than frame their response to climate change and environmental problems 
in terms of necessity and utility—though many do contend that they have economic 
barriers to consuming green goods specifically—those with LEC/HCC compositions 
often stress lowering overall rates of consumption and voluntary simplicity. In this sense, 
the approach of those with high levels of cultural capital is more abstract than the more 
immediate and convenient (e.g. recycling) reported behaviors of those with low economic 
and cultural capital. Britney, a 20 year old student whose parents are scientists that are 
“into renewable energy” (LEC/HCC), is sanguine about the prospect of technological 
solutions yet still believes curbing consumption is necessary in combating the problem: 
I think people definitely can consume less but of course science…they’ve 
advanced this far, and I feel like science can definitely help us in the future in 
terms of renewable energy. You know they come out with…I’m sure science will 
help, but people have to start now by consuming less, not letting the problem (get) 
worse.  
 
Other respondents similarly see the problem as material consumption itself, and 
dismiss the relevance of many ‘green’ products because of their place within larger 
patterns of American consumption. Charlene (LEC/HCC), a 21 year old student finishing 
a degree in Boston, expresses her inability to buy organic food consistently due to the 
price, but sees the root of combating climate change more abstractly: 
Well…I ride my bike everywhere. And like I try to buy organic food, but 
sometimes I just don’t have the money. But…those products I’d say like that label 
that sells with green and eco-friendly, I think it’s sort of hypocritical, because I 
think…like one of the problems that’s leading to global warming is also of 
consumerism, materialism. So, like if you’re…even if you’re buying something 
that says it’s eco-friendly, you might be better off not buying anything.  
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Transportation and food choices are a large part of how LEC/HCC respondents 
conceptualize their behavior related to the issue of climate change, which contrasts with 
most of the LEC/LCC respondents, who either do not connect these issues with the 
environment, or if they do, do not consistently engage with them because of economic 
reasons. Brook, a 25 year old former account coordinator for a private equity firm who 
lives in New York (LEC/HCC), emphasizes how her neighborhood embraces an 
environmentally conscious ethos with respect to food and transport: 
Brook: Like, we love going to the farmer’s market, we love buying local produce, 
trying to—they have a compost thing at the farmer’s market. We definitely ride 
our bikes…I just got a bike, so I’m excited to ride. And, um, yeah…I mean we 
take the train everywhere, so we’re not doing, you know, jumping in our cars. 
Definitely the markets in our area are all mostly organic. Trader Joe’s is a huge 
deal. Um, and I mean every, honestly, like every single new market that’s come in 
has organic. And all…a lot of the restaurants have local food. So…it’s a really big 
deal in Brooklyn. 
Interviewer: So what are the impressions of those people, does anything jump 
out? 
Brook: I mean people call us hipsters. I would not classify myself as a hipster, but 
they do. I don’t know, I enjoy it. I like it. I like…you know, taking whatever I can 
do to help better the planet, yeah.  
 
In contrast, though HEC/HCC respondents also reported that they undertook 
many behaviors they saw as environmentally beneficial and expressed a fairly 
sophisticated and abstract view of the problem, they stressed market-based solutions and 
conspicuously left unmentioned declines in consumption or voluntarily changing 
transportation behaviors. Sarah, a 28 year old analyst for a major investment firm 
(HEC/HCC), sees mechanisms like tax incentives as most effective in changing 
behaviors: 
If you give people tax credits if they buy a hybrid…I think people care way more 
about money than about the environment. The same thing…the recession…so if 
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you basically have to bribe people to treat the environment, well, then that’s the 
way you get them to do it and that’s what you gotta do.   
 
Amelia, a 49 year old saleswoman (HEC/HCC), also sees practical incentives and 
rebates as the key to ameliorating the effects of climate change and environmental issues:  
I looked at buying a hybrid…but I did the calculations of how much I would save 
on gas, and it still cost much more to buy a hybrid. I think the people that buy 
hybrids are more interested in saving the world than others…it’s not just a matter 
of saving gas. Household appliances—rebates help. The energy saver rebate, 
Obama just had a program in place, it’s probably still going if you bought certain 
windows or certain appliances, dishwashers—they had to be validated for the 
energy saver.  
 
Donna, a 47 year old engineer (HEC/HCC), similarly views climate change as a 
serious problem, and engages in a range of efforts from recycling, general household 
conservation, to walking whenever possible, but associates ‘hard-line’ calls for wholesale 
social/structural change as extremist: 
I mean I try and do what I can, you know the whole ozone layer…I you know, I 
try…I try not to idle my car and all the fumes, I try to keep the air less polluted 
with all sorts of chemicals and stuff. So I try to do my part. I try to walk whenever 
I can, ‘cause I think that’s all affecting nature and the weather that we’re having, 
but the people that are really worried about it…I got enough worries. I mean I…I 
can’t control it. I can do my little part, and that’s all I can really do. So…I 
wouldn’t say I…I associate with extremists like that.  
 
Though many of the respondents described similar lifestyle practices, how they 
were conceptualized and connected with environmental issues were largely contingent on 
both the aggregate level and compositional nature of their capital. LEC/LCC respondents 
described their own behaviors and their perception of others’ in terms of utility and 
necessity, often connecting these relatively modest actions with saving money and 
producing tangible benefits. Those LEC/HCC respondents often described material 
barriers to further engagement with some dimensions of ‘living sustainably,’ yet had a 
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more abstract view of the problem and how they related to it, while advocating for more 
structural lifestyle changes such as large-scale social shifts away from consumerism and 
biking rather than driving. When LEC/LCC respondents did mention not owning cars, for 
example, it was almost never connected to the environment, but rather framed as an 
economic constraint or outright inconvenience (e.g. Elias: “…I just got a car and 
everything’s more convenient and more accessible…it’s a whole different world with the 
car; before I was taking the T (MBTA), so I wasn’t too happy about it”). HEC/LCC 
respondents often engaged in behaviors related to climate change and other 
environmental issues, yet stressed practicality and approached the problem in more 
materialist terms. HEC/HCC respondents engaged with a range of behaviors they saw as 
environmentally conscious and often did express goals of frugality, but did not go so far 
as to question the underpinnings of the American economic system and mostly stressed 
market-based approaches to mitigation, consistent with both their place in the class 
structure and their related capital composition. 
 




 While scholars usually stress psycho-social variables in describing attitudes on 
climate change, the respondents in this study felt social class was a powerful influence 
regardless of their own class background when directly asked, “Do you think there is a 
difference in how people view climate change based on their class position?” 
Nevertheless, patterns emerged when considering whether respondents thought material 
(economic) or cultural (education and knowledge) constraints affected other’s opinions 
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regarding the subject. For instance, virtually every one of the respondents who claimed 
that material (but not cultural) constraints precluded many people from thinking or 
worrying about climate change had either low economic and cultural capital (11 out of 
16), or low economic and high cultural capital (5 out of 16). Those who thought 
education and cultural constraints precluded thinking or worrying about the issue were 
less numerous overall, and more likely to possess high levels of cultural capital. The 
remainder of the sample contended that both material and cultural constraint play a role. 
Lamont (1992) theorizes that national context influences whether economic or cultural 
boundaries are drawn between individuals (i.e. the French putting more weight on 
cultural boundaries because they are given more worth in that national context than 
economic capital). These findings suggest the possibility that the composition of capital 
of the individual may also condition the drawing of symbolic boundaries, in this case 
with regard to who is and is not perceived to be concerned about climate change. Finally, 
only three of the 42 respondents thought concern about climate change cut across 
boundaries of social class, with one offering an answer too vague to categorize. Indeed, 
many respondents had a view of climate change as a postmaterialist issue. Betty 
(LEC/HCC), an intern working at a children’s hospital, argues that it is superseded by 
more immediate material concerns: 
I don’t think that somebody who…I mean I don’t know, but I probably think that 
somebody whose main concern is what are we gonna eat, I don’t think they’re 
going to be thinking of what we’re going to eat that’s green, or what are we going 
to do to save the environment…they’re thinking how am I going to feed my 
family? So I think if people- are of limited resources, I don’t think that’s going to 
be a concern in their mind.  
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Tim, a 51 year old unemployed former government worker (LEC/LCC), goes a step 
further and contends that the perceived affluence of those “pushing” behavioral changes 
results in a backlash, especially in the context of the economic downturn: 
I think people, like, don’t agree with it because a lot of the people are…money 
and celebrities are pushing it. I think it is an issue, definitely. You know, that 
people are struggling just to get by and you’ve got people, like, with a lot of 
money pushing organics, food, and stuff…I think it’s kind of hypocritical. 
 
Jessica (LEC/LCC) contends that buying power and consumption preferences motivate 
some to conceive of climate change as a pressing issue: 
I think…it seems to be more of an upper class thing. Who’s really into it. 
Probably because they have more money to spend on the…the changes that you 
need to make in your life to buy those expensive products. And like buy different 
cars, probably can afford it more. Maybe that’s why they believe it.  
 
Abby (LEC/LCC) sees the same material constraint, and also identifies a connection 
between changing consumption patterns and celebrity. When asked if social class shapes 
how people view the issue, she answered: 
I think possibly, ‘cause you see, like a lot of celebrities and stuff like that buying 
hybrid cars, or doing something. And I think it’s partially for image and partially 
because they have the money to…invest in all that. It sounds great, but I’m sure 
the people that can’t afford stuff like that are less inclined to be a proponent. 
 
Others see both economic and cultural position as intertwined in how people perceive the 
issue. For instance, Sylvia (LEC/LCC), a 33 year old administrative assistant, sees socio-
economic class as a precursor to gaining the cultural faculties needed to comprehend and 
respond to issues like CC: 
I think it…class has something to do with it, because the higher class you are, the 
more cultured you tend to be, and the more cultured the more likely you are to 
help contribute to keeping the environment…like, kind of a little more 
knowledge, a little bit more accessibility toward what can really help. And I think 
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in the lower classes, they don’t really have that same type of cultural knowledge, 




Sophia, a 51 year old foreign currency trader (HEC/HCC), views both income and 
education as determinants of how people react to the issue, specifically in terms of 
consumption behaviors, and surmises that because she often finds ‘green’ products 
unaffordable, those less fortunate would find them even more unattainable:  
If I hesitate at buying certain products because I think they’re more expensive 
than the regular generic products, then I would have to think that people in a 
different economic bracket than me would be even less inclined than myself to 
buy green products because of cost. And I think education…I don’t know what 
they’re teaching in schools now. I’m 51, so this wasn’t even on the radar when I 
was growing up. Maybe they’re making children more aware…I would hope 
so…of the environment. But I would also think it varies by education.  
 
Sarah (HEC/HCC) sees education and political liberalism as leading to the kinds of 
behaviors associated with concern over issues like sustainability and CC, consistent with 
a ‘new class’ narrative of environmentalism: 
I think it’s the hippie-ish granola type of people that are usually…their jobs are 
usually working in the public sector and non-profits, it’s the…it’s the type of 
work they go into that gives them the lower to middle class salary which is where 
they are. Whereas people like ibankers, they couldn’t care less.  
 
Though the respondents who emphasized the material rather than cultural 
constraints of ‘acting sustainably’ in relation to climate change were universally of more 
modest economic (but not necessarily cultural) means, there was an across-the-board 
tendency for them to affirm the importance of social class in shaping how people 
approach the issue. Still, the overall emphasis on material boundaries and constraint 
among the sample as a whole suggests its more significant salience in contrast to cultural 
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faculties in an American context (Lamont 1992, p. 105), perhaps exacerbated by the 
recent economic crisis. 
 




Respondents also interpret the behaviors of others based on their capital 
composition, and ascribe an avant-garde orientation to those who are especially 
concerned about climate change and environmental issues. LEC/LCC respondents were 
far more likely to have a critical interpretation of those who were conscious or engaged in 
the issue, seeing it as a fashionable set of attitudes which are wielded in the end of 
distinguishing one’s self, or signaling “high status exclusiveness” (Lamont, 1992, p. 108). 
Frank, a 33 year old research assistant (LEC/LCC), states that those who ‘care a lot about 
the issue of climate change’ are following a trend: 
I get the impression it’s part fashion. And I get the impression there’s a little 
distortion in the way people go about getting the information they have. I think 
this is true for a lot of people. For a lot of issues. 
 
Others also characterize the climate movement as preoccupied with appearing 
fashionable. Jessica, a 20 year old student (LEC/LCC) who characterizes those concerned 
about climate change as part of a “clique,” sees the proliferation of ‘green’ products as 
indicative of this: 
Um, I think it’s sort of a fad. That people are catching onto. Like, the whole 
‘green’ thing. And I don’t know…I mean, some if it is good, but I think (there) 
are too much products out there that are saying they are green friendly, and they 
even have green buildings now. And I think it’s a fad. 
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Other LEC/LCC respondents had similar reactions, but added that these 
orientations and behaviors were merely a cynical overture for social status and 
distinction: 
Rhonda: You know…I haven’t really come into contact with people that I feel are 
genuinely concerned. I think they’re following a fad. Say for example, the just, 
the reusable bags. You know, it’s what everybody has…it’s like a trend, a cool 
thing to shop at Whole Foods, health foods. It’s a very small percentage I’ve 
come across…it’s like a fad, a cool thing to do. But I don’t think at heart they’re 




Some LEC/HCC respondents also conveyed their feeling that others who 
concerned themselves about climate change were following a fashion of sorts, yet they 
framed this as mostly material rather than symbolic distinction, and were less critical 
overall. Lindsey, a 24 year old public school teacher (LEC/HCC), implies that however 
stylish, there are substantial economic barriers to consuming with environmental issues in 
mind: 
You see…like a lot of celebrities and stuff like that buying hybrid cars, or doing 
something, and I think it’s partially for image and partially because they have the 
money to invest in all that.  
 
Britney (LEC/HCC) expressed a similar perception: 
I feel like it’s getting more in fashion to get…to be environmentally friendly. Like 
if you see celebrities, they talk about buying new hybrid cars, they spend a lot of 
money on a luxury car and emphasize it’s a hybrid. I feel like it’s more about a 
trendy thing now to be environmentally conscious. 
 
Consistent with the ‘fashion’ narrative, many in the sample saw concern about 
climate change as a marker of economic or cultural capital (or both). In contrast, 
respondents saw those who are dismissive of climate change as either lacking education, 
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scientifically ignorant, ideologically conservative, generally resistant to change, or under 
the sway of media outlets who have portrayed the scientific consensus regarding the issue 
as debatable. Still, most respondents, especially those with high levels of cultural capital, 
were unwilling to offer their take on ‘deniers’ because they rarely if ever encountered 
them in their daily life. James (LEC/HCC), a 26 year old healthcare worker, goes even 
further, actively avoiding discussing the subject because of its sometimes controversial 
implications: 
But if I’m on the T or something—if I strike up a random stranger in 
conversation…but I’m very careful now what I say and how I say it. There are 
certain topics that I tend to see as potential triggers…you know. ‘Cause the 
cuckoos or teabaggers—you can’t see them—you can’t tell right away. They’re 
very well disguised. They seem like very reasonable people. It’s just scary…you 
just don’t know where they’re lurking (laughing). 
 
Shirley (LEC/HCC), a 20 year old student, rarely talks about climate change or 
sustainability with others, but does meet some people that are trying to lessen their 
“environmental footprint” in the workplace. She describes most of these people as 
“white, more well-educated, people who, you know, would be concerned about these 
things.” As for those who dismiss it as a problem, she says she does not encounter them 
because they are not part of the college setting she spends most of her time in: 
I don’t meet so many people like that in…you know, just because of the settings 
I’m in. When you’re in college most people are environmentally aware more and 
apt to open their minds to different things, and you know ‘being green’ is a big 
trend kind of thing. So I don’t interact with people of that opinion very often. But 
I’ve definitely heard about them, and heard pieces on the news or seen opinions 
online and stuff like that. 
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Others also claimed their social circles precluded them from meeting ‘deniers.’ 
Donna (HEC/HCC) contends that most of the people she comes into contact with are 
either concerned or ambivalent: 
No. No…they’re either neutral or you know they’re more concerned. No…and I 
think…I personally think that comes from being uneducated and I don’t know 
if…alright, snobbish, but I pretty much hang out with people that are educated. 
 
Though respondents were willing to offer characterizations of those who were 
dismissive or skeptical of climate change, the HCC’s almost never engaged with them 
socially or conversationally. Again, those high in cultural capital often framed the 
boundary between themselves and those who were distanced from the issue in cultural 
terms, without mentioning socioeconomic differences (i.e. ‘uneducated’ or ‘ignorant). 
LEC/LCC respondents were more likely to develop impressions that those who cared 
about climate change were following fashion, and at times had a cynical view of them, 
sometimes exacerbated by their own skepticism about the issue. The vast majority of 
respondents across all social class backgrounds claimed to never or only rarely talk to 
others about climate change, often characterizing it as a ‘backburner’ problem that was 
not salient enough to converse or debate about. In this case, the results indicate both that 
social capital (e.g. the individual social networks of the respondents) at least for this 
modest sample is characterized by a certain insularity based on cleavages of economic 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 122), and that climate change does not register as 




 In this paper, I examined data on perceptions and behaviors related to climate 
change using the cultural theory of Bourdieu. Many key findings emerged which were 
broadly consistent with the theory. For one, HEC respondents generally took a more 
materialist approach in their conceptualization and reaction to climate change regardless 
of their level of cultural capital. LEC respondents also took a materialist approach, but 
predicated this on necessity rather than parsimony. They were also more likely to express 
antagonistic views of those who cared about the issue based on their belief that issues like 
climate change are either less important in light of immediate needs, or that responding to 
it requires greater expenditures than they could realistically afford. Moreover, status 
distinctions were drawn such that LCC respondents often viewed those who cared about 
the issue as seeking a fashionable way to convey their social position. HCC respondents 
were more likely to view those who denied or ignored the issue as ignorant or 
uneducated.  
 These findings suggest that social class may play a more important role in the 
formation of attitudes related to environmental problems—particularly complex global 
issues like climate change—than much of the research on the topic would suggest. 
Clearly the vast majority of respondents cared to some extent about climate change even 
if they thought it was partially exaggerated (none of the respondents denied it was 
occurring outright). Nevertheless, social distinctions, often involving cultural and 
economic differences, seem to affect their own behaviors, their purported solutions (i.e. 
buying less vs. tax incentives; recycling vs. biking), and their perception of others in 
relation to climate change and sustainability. Theorists often describe the muted response 
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to these issues as psychological or cognitive, but these findings suggest the possibility 
that they are also culturally fraught and contested on the grounds of structural differences, 
and possess subtle symbolic meanings which convey different things to different groups 
of people. The class antagonisms Bourdieu describes and which are illustrated by many 
of the respondents in this analysis—the poorer and less educated seeing environmental 
concerns as “luxury items” (Taylor, 1989, p. 182)—suggest how important these 
distinctions may be in coming to a common, collective consensus to act. The potential for 
a class-contingent variegation how people understand and react to these issues and even 
social antagonism based on these boundaries suggests that we be fully aware of the 
material and cultural constraints—both real and perceived—in affirming climate change 
as one of the greatest social and environmental problems of our time.   
 34 
References 
Abramson, P.R., and R. Inglehart. (1994). “Economic Security and Value Change.” The 
American Political Science Review, 88(2), 336-354.  
 
Autio, Minna, Eva Heiskanen, and Visa Heinonen. (2009). “Narratives of ‘Green’ 
Consumers- The Antihero, the Environmental Hero and the Anarchist.” Journal of 
Consumer Behavior, 8, p. 40-53.  
 
Barkan, Steven E. 2004. “Explaining Public Support for the Environmental Movement: A 
Civic Voluntarism Model.”Social Science Quarterly 85(4): 913-937. 
 
Berger, Ida E. 1997. “The Demographics of Recycling and the Structure of 
Environmental Behavior.” Environment and Behavior 29(4): 515-532. 
 
Berger, J., and M. Ward. (2010). “Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption.” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 37(4), p. 555-569.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Boykoff, Maxwell T., and Jules M. Boykoff. 2004. “Balance as Bias: Global Warming 
and the US Prestige Press.” Global Environmental Change 14: 125-136. 
 
Brécard, Dorothée, Boubaker Hlaimi, Sterenn Lucas, Yves Perraudeau, and Frédéric 
Salladarré. (2009). “Determinants of Demand for Green Products: An Application 
to Eco-Label Demand for Fish in Europe.” Ecological Economics, 1(15), p. 115-
125.  
 
Brechin, Steven R. Forthcoming. “Public Opinion: A Cross-National View.” In 
Routledge Handbook of Climate Change and Society (ed. Constance Lever-
Tracy). Routledge, London, England.  
 
Brown, Keith R. (2011). “Interaction Ritual Chains and the Mobilization of 
Conscientious Consumers.” Qualitative Sociology, 34, p. 121-141.  
 
Buttel, Frederick H. 1987. “New Directions in Environmental Sociology.”Annual Review 
of Sociology 13: 465-488. 
 
Buttell, Frederick H., and William L. Flinn. 1978. “Social Class and Mass Environmental 
Beliefs: A Reconsideration.” Environment and Behavior 10(3): 433-450. 
 
Catton, William R., and Riley E. Dunlap. 1978. “Paradigms, Theories, and the Primacy 
of the HEP-NEP Distinction.” The American Sociologist 13(4): 256-259. 
 35 
 
Chambers, Stephanie, Alexandra Lobb, Laurie Butler, Kate Harvey, and W. Bruce Traill. 
(2007). “Local, National, and Imported Foods: A Qualitative Study.” Appetite, 49, 
208-213.  
 
Clark, Terry Nichols. 2003. “The Breakdown of Class Politics.” The American 
Sociologist 34(1): 17-32. 
 
Clark, Terry Nichols, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Michael Rempel. 1993. “The 
Declining Political Significance of Social Class.” International Sociology 8(3): 
293-316. 
 
Connolly, John, and Andrea Prothero. 2008. “Green Consumption: Life-Politics, Risk 
and Contradictions.” Journal of Consumer Culture 8(1): 117-145. 
 
Dietz, Thomas, Amy Dan, and Rachael Shwom. 2007. “Support for Climate Change 
Policy: Social Psychological and Social Structural Variables.” Rural Sociology 
72(2): 185-21. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E. 2008. “The New Environmental Paradigm Scale: From Marginality to 
Worldwide Use.” The Journal of Environmental Education 40(1): 3-18. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Aaron M. McCright. 2008a. “Social Movement Identity: 
Validating a Measure of Identification with the Environmental Movement.” 
Social Science Quarterly 89(5): 1045-1065. 
 
———. (2008b). “A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on Climate 
Change.” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 50(5), 
p. 26-35.  
 
Eckersley, Robyn. 1989. “Green Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or Virtue?” 
Political Studies 37(2): 205-223. 
 
Ehrenreich, Barbara, and John Ehrenreich. (1977). “The Professional-Managerial Class.” 
Radical America 11: 3-6.    
 
Ellis, Richard J., and Fred Thompson. 1997. “Culture and the Environment in the Pacific 
Northwest.” The American Political Science Review 91(4): 885-897. 
 
Erickson, Bonnie H. (1996). “Culture, Class, and Connections.” American Journal of 
Sociology, 102(1), p. 217-251.  
 
Evans, David, and Wokje Abrahamse. (2009). “Beyond Rhetoric: The Possibilities of and 
for ‘Sustainable Lifestyles.’” Environmental Politics, 18(4), p. 486-502.  
 36 
 
Friedland, Lewis, Dhavan V. Shah, Nam-Jin Lee, Mark A. Rademacher, Lucy Atkinson, 
and Thomas Hove. 2007. “Capital, Consumption, Communication, and 
Citizenship: The Social Positioning of Taste and Civic Culture in the U.S.” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 611: 31-49. 
 
Gamba, Raymond J., and Stuart Oskamp. 1994. “Factors Influencing Community 
Residents’ Partipicipation in Commingled Curbside Recycling Programs.” 
Environment and Behavior 26(5): 587-612. 
 
Gatersleben, Birgitta, Linda Steg, and Charles Vlek. 2002. “Measurement and 
Determinants of Environmentally Significant Consumer Behavior.” Environment 
and Behavior 34: 335-362. 
 
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1978. “The New Class Project, I.” Theory and Society 6(2): 153-203. 
 
Guber, Deborah Lynn. 2003. The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: Polling America on 
the Environment. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Guthman, Julie. (2003). “Fast Food/Organic Food: Reflexive Tastes and the Making of 
‘Yuppie Chow.’” Social and Cultural Geography, 4(1), 45-58.  
 
Hartmann, Patrick, and Vanessa Apaolaza-Ibáñez. (2008). “Virtual Nature Experiences 
as Emotional Benefits in Green Product Consumption.” Environment and 
Behavior, 40(6), p. 818-842. 
 
Hechter, Michael. 2004. “From Class to Culture.” American Journal of Sociology 110(2): 
400-445.  
 
Hobson, Kersty. (2002). “Competing Discourses of Sustainable Consumption: Does the 
‘Rationalisation of Lifestyles’ Make Sense?” Environmental Politics, 11(2), p. 95-
120.  
 
Hobson, Kersty. (2006). “Environmental Psychology and the Geographies of Ethical and 
Sustainable Consumption: Aligning, Triangulating, Challening?” Area, 38(3), p. 
292-300.  
 
Holt, D.B. (1997). “Distinction in America? Recovering Bourdieu’s Theory of Tastes 
from its Critics.” Poetics, 25(2), p. 93-120.  
 
Holt, Douglas B. 1998. “Does Cultural Capital Structure American Consumption?” 
Journal of Consumer Research 25: 1-25. 
 
 37 
Hurth, Victoria. 2010. “Creating Sustainable Identities: The Significance of the 
Financially Affluent Self.” Sustainable Development 18: 123-134.  
 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1981. “Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity.” The 
American Political Science Review 75(4): 880-900. 
 
———. 1982. “Changing Values in Japan and the West.” Comparative Political Studies 
14(4): 445-479. 
 
———. 1987. “Value Change in Industrial Societies.” The American Political Science 
Review 81(4): 1289-1319. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Paul R. Abramson. 1999. “Measuring Postmaterialism.” The 
American Political Science Review 93(3): 665-677. 
 
Jacques, Peter J., Riley E. Dunlap, and Mark Freeman. 2008. “The Organisation of 
Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Skepticism.” 
Environmental Politics 17(3): 349-385.  
 
Jenkins, Robin R., Salvador A. Martinez, Karen Palmer, and Michael J. Podolsky. 2003. 
“The Determinants of Household Recycling: A Material-Specific Analysis of 
Recycling Program Features and Unit Pricing.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 45: 294-318. 
 
Johnston, Josée. (2008). “The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and the 
Case of Whole Foods Market.” Theory and Sociology, 37, p. 229-270.  
 
Johnston, Josée, and Shyon Baumann. (2009). Foodies: Democracy and Distinction in 
the Gourmet Foodscape. Routledge, New York.  
 
Jones, Jeffrey. (2011). “In U.S., Concerns About Global Warming Stable at Lower 
Levels.” Gallup Polling, March 14th
 
, 2011. Retrieved 20 April, 2011: < 
http://www.gallup.com/ poll/146606/Concerns-Global-Warming-Stable-Lower-
Levels.aspx> 
Jones, Jeffrey. (2011). “Americans Increasingly Prioritize Economy over Environment.” 
Gallup Polling, March 17th
 
, 2011. Retrieved 21 April, 2011: 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/146681/Americans-increasingly-prioritize-
economy-environment.aspx>   
Karp, David Gutierrez. (1996). “Values and Their Effect on Pro-Environmental 
Behavior.” Environment and Behavior, 28(1), p. 111-133. 
 
 38 
Kennedy, Emily Huddart, Thomas M. Beckley, Bonita L. McFarlane, and Solange 
Nadeau. 2009. “Why We Don’t ‘Walk the Talk’: Understanding the 
Environmental Values/Behavior Gap in Canada.” Human Ecology Review 16(2): 
151-160. 
 
Kollmuss, Anja, and Julian Agyeman. 2002. “Mind the Gap: Why Do People Act 
Environmentally and What are the Barriers to Pro-environment Behavior?” 
Environmental Education Research 8(3): 239-260. 
 
Krosnick, Jon A., Allyson L. Holbrook, Laura Lowe, and Penny S. Visser. 2006. “The 
Origins and Consequences of Democratic Citizens’ Policy Agendas: A Study of 
Popular Concern About Global Warming.” Climatic Change 77: 7-43. 
 
Lamont, Michele. 1987. “Cultural Capital and the Liberal Political Attitudes of 
Professionals: Comment on Brint.” The American Journal of Sociology 92(6): 
1501-1506.  
 
Lamont, Michele. (1992). “Symbolic Boundaries and Status.” In Cultural Sociology (Ed.: 
Spillman, Lyn). Oxford/Blackwell, Malden, MA, p. 98-107.  
 
Leiserowitz, Anthony A. 2005. “American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change 
Dangerous?” Risk Analysis 25(6): 1433-1442. 
 
Leiserowitz, Anthony A., Connie Roser-Renouf, and Edward Maibach. 2009. “Global 
Warming’s Six Americas 2009: An Audience Segmentation Analysis.” 4C: Yale 
Project on Climate Change and GMU Center for Climate Change 
Communication.  
 < http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/05/pdf/6americas.pdf>  
 
Leudicke, Marius, Craig J. Thompson, and Markus Giesler. (2010). “Consumer Identity 
Work as Moral Protagonism: How Myth and Ideology Animate a Brand-Mediated 
Moral Conflict.” Journal of Consumer Research, 36, p. 1016-1032.  
 
Lewis, Tania. 2008. “Transforming Citizens? Green Politics and Ethical Consumption on 
Lifestyle Television.”Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 22(2): 
227-240. 
 
Lorenzoni, Irene, and Nick F. Pidgeon. 2006. “Public Views on Climate Change: 
European and USA Perspectives.” Climatic Change 77: 73-95. 
 
Lorenzoni, Irene, Anthony Leiserowitz, Miguel De Franca Doria, Wouter Poortinga, and 
Nick Pidegon. 2006. “Cross-National Comparisons of Image Associations with 
‘Global Warming’ and ‘Climate Change’ Among Laypeople in the United States 
of America and Great Britain.” Journal of Risk Research 9(3): 265-281.  
 39 
 
Lubell, Mark, Sammy Zahran, and Arnold Vedlitz. 2007. “Collective Action and Citizen 
Responses to Global Warming.” Political Behavior 29(1): 391-413. 
 
McCright, Aaron M. (2009). “The Social Bases of Climate Change Knowledge, Concern, 
and Policy Support in the U.S. General Public.” Hofstra Law Review, 37, p. 1017. 
 
Moisander, Johanna. (2007). “Motivational Complexity of Green Consumerism.” 
International Journal of Consumer Studies, 31, 404-409.  
 
Mol, Arthur P.J. (2003). Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological 
Modernization of the Global Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Morrison, Denton E., and Riley E. Dunlap. 1986. “Environmentalism and Elitism: A 
Conceptual and Empirical Analysis.” Environmental Management 10(5): 581-
589. 
 
Newport, Frank. (2009). “Americans: Economy Takes Precedence over Environment.” 
Gallup Polling, March 19th
 
, 2009. Retrieved 20 April, 2011: 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/116962/Americans-Economy-Takes-Precedence-
Environment.aspx>  
Newport, Frank. (2010). “American’s Global Warming Concerns Continue to Drop.” 
Gallup Polling. March 11th
 
, 2010. Retrieved 20 April, 2011: < 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 126560/Americans-Global-Warming-Concerns-
Continue-Drop.aspx>  
O’Connor, Robert E., Richard J. Bord, and Ann Fisher. (1999). “Risk Perceptions, 
General Environmental Beliefs, and Willingness to Address Climate Change.” 
Risk Analysis, 19(3), p. 461-471. 
 
Onyango, Benjamin M., William K. Hallman, and Anne. C. Bellows. (2007). “Purchasing 
Organic Food in U.S. Food Systems: A Study of Attitudes and Practice.” British 
Food Journal, 109(5), p. 399-411.  
 
Peterson, Richard A., and Roger M. Kern. 1996. “Changing Highbrow Taste: From Snob 
to Omnivore.” American Sociological Review 61(5): 900-907. 
 
Pew Research. October 22nd 
 
, 2009. “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence for Global 
Warming.” < http://people-press.org/report/556/global-warming>  
Pichardo, Nelson A. 1997. “New Social Movements: A Critical Review.” Annual Review 
of Sociology 23: 411-430.  
 
 40 
Princen, Thomas. (2005). The Logic of Sufficiency. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Rose, Fred. 1997. “Toward a Class-Cultural Theory of Social Movements: Reinterpreting 
New Social Movements.” Sociological Forum 12(3): 461-494. 
 
Saad, Lydia. (2009). “Increased Number Think Global Warming Is ‘Exaggerated.’” 
Gallup Polling, March 11th
 
, 2009. Retrieved 20 April, 2011: < 
http://www.gallup.com/ poll/116590/increased-number-think-global-warming-
exaggerated.aspx>  
Saad, Lydia. (2011). “Water Issues Worry Americans Most, Global Warming Least.” 
Gallup Polling, March 29th
 
, 2011. Retrieved 20 April, 2011: < 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 146810/Water-Issues-Worry-Americans-Global-
Warming-Least.aspx>  
Samdahl, Diane M., and Robert Robertson. 1989. “Social Determinants of Environmental 
Concern- Specification and Test of the Model.” Environment and Behavior 21(1): 
57-81. 
 
Schnaiberg, Allan. (1980). The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. Oxford 
University Press, New York.  
 
Schor, Juliet. (1998). The Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don’t Need. 
Harper Perennial, New York.  
 
Schultz, P. Wesley, Stuart Oskamp and Tina Mainieri. 1995. “Who Recycles and When? 
A Review of Personal and Situational Factors.” Journal of Environmental 
Psychology 15: 105-121. 
 
Shah, Dhavan V., Douglas M. McLeod, Eunkyung Kim, Sun Young Lee, Melissa R. 
Gotlieb, Shirley S. Ho, and Hilde Breivik. 2007. “Political Consumerism: How 
Communication and Consumption Drive ‘Lifestyle Politics.’” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 611: 217-235. 
 
Shaw, Deirdre, Emma Grehen, Edward Shiu, Louise Hassan, and Jennifer Thompson. 
(2005). “An Exploration of Values in Ethical Consumer Decision Making.” 
Journal of Consumer Behavior, 4(3), p. 185-200.  
 
Shrode, J. Robert, and Mary Hallock Morris. 2009. “The Influence of Gender, Race, and 
Party Identification on Attitudes about Global Warming.” Indiana Journal of 
Political Science 2008/2009: 59-64. 
 
 41 
Sidique, Shaufique, Frank Lupi, and Satish V. Joshi. 2010. “The Effects of Behavior and 
Attitudes on Drop-Off Recycling Activities.” Resources, Conservation, and 
Recycling 54(1): 163-170. 
 
Soron, Dennis. 2010. “Sustainability, Self-Identity and the Sociology of Consumption.” 
Sustainable Development 18: 172-181. 
 
Starr, Martha. 2009. “The Social Economics of Ethical Consumption: Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Socio-Economics 38: 916-
935. 
 
Strandbu, Ase, and Olve Krange. (2008). “Youth and the Environmental Movement: 
Symbolic Inclusions and Exclusions.” The Sociological Review, 51(2), p. 177-
198.  
 
Tadajewski, Mark, and Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto. (2006). “Anthropology and 
Consumer Research: Qualitative Insights into Green Consumer Behavior.” 
Qualitative Market Research, 9(1), p. 8-25.  
 
Taylor, Dorceta E. 1989. “Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanation of the 
Concern and Action Gap Between Blacks and Whites.” Environment and 
Behavior 21(2): 175-205. 
 
Trentmann, Frank. 2007. “Citizenship and Consumption.” Journal of Consumer Culture 
7(2): 147-158. 
 
Trigg, Andrew B. (2001). “Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous Consumption.” Journal 
of Economic Issues, 35(1), p. 99-115.  
 
Uyeki, Eugene S., and Lani J. Holland. 2000. “Diffusion of Pro-Environmental 
Attitudes?” American Behavioral Scientist 43(4): 646-662. 
 
Van der Waal, J., Peter Achterberg, and Dick Houtman. (2007). “Class Is Not Dead- It 
Has Been Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western 
Societies (1956-1990).” Politics and Society, 35(3), p. 403-426.  
 
Van Liere, Kent D., and Riley E. Dunlap. 1980. “The Social Bases of Environmental 
Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence.” The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 44(2): 181-197. 
 
Weber, Elke U. 2006. “Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-




Weber, Max. (1946) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Eds.: C. Wright Mills and 
H.H. Gerth). Oxford University Press, New York.  
 
Young, William, Kumju Hwang, Seonaidh McDonald, and Caroline J. Oates. (2010). 
“Sustainable Consumption: Green Consumer Behavior When Purchasing 
Products.” Sustainable Development, 18, 20-31.  
 
Zahran, Sammy, Himanshu Grover, Samuel D. Brody, and Arnold Vedlitz. 2008. “Risk, 
Stress, and Capacity: Explaining Metropolitan Commitment to Climate 







Detailed data for all participants (N = 42) 
Name Age Sex Ethnicity Income Degree Home Car Party 
Desig. 
EC CC 
Jane 58 F White 45000 B.A. Y Y I HEC HCC 
James 26 M African-
American 
30000 B.A. N N I LEC HCC 
Elias 44 M Hispanic 12000 H.S. N Y N LEC LCC 
Sarah 28 F White 60000 B.A. M Y D HEC HCC 
Amelia 49 F White 100000 B.A. Y Y D HEC HCC 
Emily 84 F White 12000 M.A. Y Y D LEC LCC 
Frank 33 M White 40000 B.A. N N N LEC LCC 
Helen 63 F White 12000 M.A. Y N D LEC HCC 
Michelle 80 F White 12000 M.A. Y Y D LEC LCC 
Jessica 20 F African-
American 
25000 H.S. N N N LEC LCC 
Rhonda 45 F African-
American 
0 H.S. N N N LEC LCC 
Eric 53 M African-
American 
7000 H.S. N N N LEC LCC 
Donna 47 F White 90000 M.A. M Y N HEC HCC 
Lindsey 24 F White 42000 M.A. N Y N LEC HCC 
Shirley 20 F White 5000 B.A. N Y D LEC HCC 
Charlene 21 F Asian-
American 
0 B.A. N N N LEC HCC 
Betty 23 F Hispanic 5000 B.A. N Y I LEC HCC 
Yvette 42 F White 150000 J.D. M Y I HEC HCC 
Dan 72 M White 15000 H.S. N N D LEC LCC 
Britney 20 F Asian-
American 
20000 B.A. N Y D LEC HCC 
Derek 34 M White 0 B.A. N Y D LEC LCC 
Abby 30 F Hispanic 1500 H.S. N N D LEC LCC 
Brook 25 F White 0 B.A. N N D LEC HCC 
Samuel 59 M White 50000 B.A. M N D LEC LCC 
Harry 47 M African-
American 
0 H.S. N N D LEC LCC 
Richard 48 M White 100000 M.A. N N D HEC LCC 
Ron 40 M White 40000 H.S. N N I LEC LCC 
Gina 52 F White 29000 M.A. N N N LEC LCC 
Janet 68 F White 18000 H.S. N Y D LEC LCC 
Laura 21 F Asian-
American 
29000 B.A. N N D LEC LCC 
Michael 40 M White 15000 B.A. N N I LEC LCC 
Naomi 29 F African-
American 
40000 B.A. N N D LEC LCC 
Tim 51 M White 10000 H.S. N N I LEC LCC 
Jane 45 F White 40000 B.A. N N D LEC LCC 
Shannon 43 F White 50000 M.A. Y Y D HEC HCC 
Sylvia 33 F Hispanic 0 M.A. N Y D LEC LCC 
Sophia 51 F White 100000 M.A. Y Y D HEC HCC 
Ruth 55 F White 85000 J.D. Y Y I HEC HCC 
Mark 33 M White 35000 B.A. N Y I LEC HCC 
Olivia 32 F African-
American 
39000 H.S. N N I LEC LCC 
 44 
Jeffrey 64 M White 6000 B.A. N Y I LEC LCC 
Patrick 38 M White 30000 H.S. N N D LEC LCC 
  
Note: Home/Car = Homeowners (M = mortgage)/car owners. Party designation is political party affiliation (I = 
Independent; D = Democrat; R = Republican; N = Not registered). Economic capital categories (LEC/HEC) were 
determined using a point system, with those scoring above 18 being assigned to the HEC category, and those scoring 
lower assigned to the LEC category. Income intervals were given the following points (the points are not allocated in 
linear fashion, to distinguish higher income earners):  $0 – 14999 = +2; 15000 – 29999 = +4; 30000 – 44999 = +6; 
45000 – 59999 = +9; 60000 – 74999 = +12; 75000 – 89999 = +15; 90000 – 104999 = +19; 105 – 119999 = 24; 
120000+ = +30. Homeowners were given +12 points, while those with mortgages were given +6. Car owners were 
given +2. Cultural capital was determined by years of tertiary education between respondents and their parents (with 
12 or more being categorized as HCC). This was determined assuming B.A.’s constituted 4 years, M.A./M.B.A.’s 6, 







Descriptive Statistics for EC/CC Categories 
 LCC (N = 27) HCC (N = 15) 
Average # Years of Tertiary Education 4.19 15.20 
 LEC (N = 33) HEC (N = 9) 
Average Self-Reported Income (2010, U.S.D.) $18,000 $87,000 
Median Self-Reported Income (2010, U.S.D.) $15,000 $90,000 
Homeowners and Mortgage Holders 4 (12.1%) 8 (89%) 
Car Owners 12 (36.3%) 8 (89%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
